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More than ten years after the end of the East-West conflict it is still difficult to 
say anything comparatively final concerning the current structure of 
international relations. Analysts speak about a post-Cold War era as eloquent 
demonstration of uncertainty. The little we know is that the international system 
has departed from bipolarity and has increasingly been dominated by a 
combination of hegemonic unilateralism and limited multipolarity of a concert 
of great powers. It is a system of democracies in the sense that democratic 
countries play a major role in it. It is more democratic than the bipolar one left 
behind. It is not a democratic system, nevertheless. This fact is relevant as none 
of the candidate countries for EU membership are great powers -  the absence of 
great powers in East-Central Europe has characterised the region for some time. 
Thus, even though the end of the rigid bipolar structure of international relations 
resulted in a fundamental change for the countries of East-Central Europe, it did 
not mean they could become either major or independent actors of international 
relations. The drastic change seems fundamental enough to get out of the 
shadow of the ailing Soviet Union and revise their political orientation, it did not 
basically change their importance in international affairs.
This paper attempts to present the links established between the second 
pillar of the European Union and the candidate countries, the significance of this 
association with the EU for East-Central Europe and the repercussions of the 
recent evolution of CFSP upon the prospects and dilemmas of relations between 
the EU and the candidates.
1. The Question of Regional Identity
It is an important preliminary question to decide whether we can speak about a 
regional identity in East-Central Europe and thus whether there is a chance to 
form some identical expectations towards the region. There are four factors one 
should bear in mind: 1. The region consists of small and medium size countries.
2. The countries are all located between the western border of the former Soviet 
Union and the eastern border of Germany. This means they certainly have a 
Zwischeneuropa identity. 3. During the East-West conflict era these states 
belonged to the group of socialist countries. This was reflected in the lack of 
private property (with the exception of agriculture in some countries), the 
absence of democracy and cle facto or de jure one party rule. 4. The international 
commitments, as the aspirations, of the ten countries are largely similar. Each of 
them has concluded so-called Europe or association agreements with the EU and 
embarked upon negotiating their membership. Each of them has participated in 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), in the Partnership for Peace 



























































































there are important differences: Three countries of the region, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, have become members of NATO, four of them, 
the three mentioned previously and Slovakia, have joined the OECD.
Rather then presenting a detailed map of historical differences it is suffice 
to point out that the region is an artificial construct. In spite of this the world at 
large has had a tendency to regard the region as a unit at least temporarily. This 
is not explained by long-term cultural considerations, not based on the 
difference between civilisations. It is determined by the need of actual politics 
and to some extent explained by history. This is due to the ’double identities’ 
“which shape the domestic and foreign policy agendas and the articulation of 
national interests” of the East-Central European states. “The concept of double 
identity refers to the two distinct components of the national identity of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe which determine the nation’s self­
perception and strongly influence the government’s foreign policy. These two 
components of identity are the traditional identity, dating from the pre-Second 
World War period when these countries were part of the unstable balance of 
power system before and after the Versailles settlement, and second, the post- 
communist identity which is centred around the urgent need for political and 
economic reconstruction in the wake of the failed communist experiment.”1 *
There is also a more recent commonality, namely that they “have succeeded in 
avoiding the military escalation of international disputes, their political agenda 
has been dominated by non-military issues, and they all want to integrate into 
Western security institutions”.' Hence there is some practical reason to keep the 
group together at least for the time being.3
It is not contrary to the above-said that differentiation, based on the self­
differentiation of the candidates, will be unavoidable in due course. This has 
already happened practically in every (formerly) western institution and the 
experience of the last decade does not give any indication why it should not 
continue. It has been one of the most persistent efforts of western institutions 
and their member-states to postpone such differentiation as much as possible in 
order no East-Central European country would face the humiliating effect of not 
performing well enough. More precisely put it is important to avoid it as much 
as possible in order to keep countries on track and not let them lose momentum 
stemming from their willingness to integrate.
1 Stefan Tafrov, Interests and Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, in Ian Gambles (ed.), 
A Lasting Peace in Central Europe? Chaillot Paper no. 20, October 1995, pp. 81-82.
'  Pal Dunay, Whence the Threat to Peace in Europe? In Ian Gambles (ed.), Op. cit. p. 41.
’ This does not exclude that further countries joining the group would not jump ahead of the 
list in the future. This may well be the case with Croatia that initialled its association 
agreement with the EU in May 2001. It is the general expectation that soon after this 




























































































When analysts have addressed the foreign policy orientation of the countries of 
the region after the end of the East-West conflict it has been the most important 
methodological shortcoming that they have started out from the international 
interests of the countries rather than their broader political orientation. Had 
they started out from the “desire” to prosper and be democratic the international 
engagement would have been self-evident. The countries faced a difficult 
situation when the East-West conflict came to an end. They had to identify their 
new political course and the new international engagement they opt for 
accordingly. According to a British analyst the countries of the region had seven 
options to provide for their security and set their new international agenda. 1. A 
reformed alliance with the Soviet Union, 2. Neutrality or non-alignment. 3. 
Regional security co-operation within Eastern Europe, 4. Integration with the 
West, 5. Pan-European collective or common security through the CSCE, 6. A 
realpolitik balance of power policy, or 7. Reliance on their national resources.4 5If 
one takes a closer look and starts out from a comprehensive analysis of the new 
democracies it is easy to draw the conclusion that these scenarios did not have 
equal relevance for the East-Central European countries. Ad 1) They said 
goodbye to the Soviet system and were certainly unwilling to establish any new 
arrangement with that country.3 For many (e.g. Czechoslovakia and Hungary) 
the era of socialism meant a relative economic decline compared to the 1930s. 
Ad 2) The same cannot be said about neutrality which was quite popular in some 
countries that left the Warsaw Treaty. The situation was the most spectacular in 
Hungary, the country where Prime Minister Nagy declared neutrality during the 
October 1956 revolution. Nonetheless, the political elite gave increasing credit 
to that neutrality can only be a transitional measure until a more clear 
determination to belong to the West, including its institutions, when it can be 
declared. Ad 3) Regional co-operation was an idea that countries of the region 
gave serious consideration and regarded as it an important ingredient of the post- 
Cold War structure of international relations. It has always been regarded as a 
complementary element rather than a comprehensive agenda. Ad 4) Integration 
with the West was the arrangement that was regarded as a panacea for many 
problems of the region. There are two fundamental differences between other 
arrangements and western integration, however. A) There is a combination of
2. The Foreign Policy Orientation of East-Central Europe
4 Andrew Cottey, East Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995), p. 13.
5 It is suffice to mention that with the exception of Romania no former member of the 
Warsaw Treaty signed a bilateral agreement on friendship and co-operation with the Soviet 
Union. Romanian analysts are of the view that the signing of the accord by Bucharest did not 




























































































sticks and carrots provided by the western democracies and their institutions.6 B) 
The West has demonstrated the capacity to resolving broader problems, 
including the request of the region to be prosperous as well as stable and secure. 
Ad 5) The idea of a collective security system in Europe was nurtured by some 
far-fetched visionary thinkers, some of them also gained political power. The 
best known was Czechoslovak, and later Czech, President Vaclav Havel. In this 
case the idea was given up by the Central and Eastern European countries not so 
much because of opposition, but for the conclusion that it cannot be realised. 
Furthermore, any real “collective security” regime based on the CSCE would 
have unavoidably meant that the organisation would have gained more teeth, 
including eventually the differentiation between smaller participating states and 
great powers. Moreover, as the Soviet Union, and in the early phase of its 
existence the Russian Federation, were so adamant to subordinate other security 
institutions to the CSCE the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were 
highly suspicious about it. As there are no great powers in the region these 
countries will always be suspicious when the role of great powers has been 
mentioned. This was particularly the case in 1990-91 when they were full of 
illusions concerning the democratic nature of international politics in the post- 
Cold War era. Ad 6) The concept of balance of power was not seriously 
considered by countries of the region. Beyond the philosophical opposition to it 
one has to understand that when the main source of concern is instability and not 
a concrete threat it is difficult to apply such a concept. Ad 7) Reliance on 
national resources, sort of a “stand alone” policy in international relations was 
regarded entirely as inadequate. Bearing in mind the historic experiences, the 
capabilities of the countries of the region and the complex external challenges 
they have faced, this approach was understandable. Consequently, both in light 
of the new political orientation of the East-Central European countries and their 
international agenda the attempt of western integration was the unrivalled 
dominant idea in the region.
The western integration effort of East-Central Europe consists probably of 
four major elements: 1). The East Central European countries have always felt 
that they belong to European civilisation irrespective of how short-lived 
democracy was in the history of some of these countries. Most countries of the 
region have no other roots than the one connecting them with European 
civilisation and (western) Christianity. Many intellectuals in the region felt that 
their countries were tom apart from their root of civilisation against their will. 
Furthermore, democracy is the model the majority of the population is willing to
6 As a Polish document states "... a membership in EU will be the best guarantee of 
consolidating Poland’s democratic political model. It will ensure the irreversibility of the 
transformation process by consolidating Poland’s democratic political model. It will ensure 
the irreversibility of the transformation process...” See, Stanislaw Parzymies, Poland 




























































































follow in these countries.7 2). The region west of East-Central Europe is 
economically more developed than the region proper. Hence the “return to 
Europe” according to their conviction would boost their economic development. 
This process has been underway and has brought certain results. 3. The West has 
been connected by several institutions and demonstrated significant stability in 
the last half a century. 4. The West is tied by a security web that also includes 
the strongest military power of the world, the United States. These four factors 
have all been present when the countries of East-Central Europe strive to join 
the West. Western analysts share this opinion. The process implies “rejoining 
the cultural, nonnative and religious mainstream of Europe, joining European 
institutions such as the Council of Europe and the EU, integrating into the 
European economy and participating in the transatlantic and West European 
security community”.8
The strife for western integration resulted in a situation whereby the 
countries of East-Central Europe wanted to join every western institution and 
programme without discrimination and hesitation. This has reflected certain 
non-discrimination in the process. On the other hand, there was certain 
discrimination in the process as well. Every institution has had a specific 
contribution to make according to the expectations of the countries of the region. 
NATO has been the security provider, the EU’s primary task has been to 
contribute to economic modernisation and prosperity whereas the Council of 
Europe should confirm the achievements of democratic transformation. The 
overlaps for example between the membership requirements of the Council of 
Europe and the first part of the EU Copenhagen criteria9 or between the NATO 
enlargement study of 1995 and any of the former did not matter much to the 
east-central European conception of the role of each institution. That is why I 
find it relevant to mention that the western integration o f East-Central Europe in 
light of the political establishment of the countries of the region takes place in 
“boxes". The box of the EU, despite its three-pillar structure since the 
Maastricht Treaty, is economy, the first pillar more broadly, including the 
Schengen regime and not much else. This is one of the reasons why the East-
7 This is conect despite the disillusioning experience in several countries in the first years 
after the political transition. Furthermore, it complicated the situation that the system change 
was accompanied by severe economic decline in most countries. Consequently, the 
population could conclude democracy results in declining standard of living, unemployment 
and poverty.
8 Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe (Manchester -  New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 188.
9 One could prove this with many citations. It is suffice to cite the programme of the 
Hungarian government that stated “the objective of the EU accession negotiations is to realise 
the economic interests” of Hungary. See Az uj evezred ktiszoben: Kormanyprogram a polgari 
Magyarorszagert /On the eve of the new millennium: Government programme for civic 




























































































Central European countries are astonished when the regular country reports 
comment on the state of democracy, the freedom of the press or the treatment of 
the roma population -  matters that supposedly belong to the realm of other 
institutions. The approach and later the accession to different institutions has had 
an important legitimising function confirming that the given country is on the 
right track. The fact that western integration has been put on the top of the 
political priority list in most East-Central European countries resulted in that the 
performance reflected in gaining membership, starting accession talks, in the 
participation in certain projects or the lack thereof, becoming a source of 
controversy.
3. The Association of East-Central European countries with CFSP
As early as 1990. prior to the signature of the Europe Agreements with the first 
three East-Central European countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 
the governments of the region started to make significant efforts to align their 
foreign policies with those of Western Europe on an ad hoc basis. The 
rediscovery of the ‘European destiny’ needed to be substantiated by the 
countries of the region. This could be done easily through the policies of these 
governments on remote crises. Though much of these policies followed the new 
political philosophies of the democratically elected governments, it seems that at 
least some of them stemmed more from the will to demonstrate political 
solidarity than from genuine political concern or economic interests.
The political dialogue started early on 2 April 1992 in Lisbon at a meeting 
at the level of political directors. A more institutionalised form of co-operation 
was established after the Copenhagen summit of June 1993. It was further 
extended by resolutions of the General Affairs Council on 7 March 1994 and 
guidelines accepted by the political directors on 25 October 1994. Later it was 
modified by the revised guidelines of the political dialogue accepted by the 
political directors on 19 October 1995. The regular political dialogue under 
Article 2 (1) of the Europe Agreements is formulated somewhat ambiguously. It 
states that the EU “assists the associated country in its full reintegration into the 
community of democratic nations, involves better understanding and an 
increasing convergence of positions on international issues, enables each party 
to consider the position and interests of the other party in their respective 
decision-making process, and it contributes to the rapprochement of the parties’ 
positions on security issues and enhances security and stability in the whole of 
Europe”. Various levels and channels of communication between the EU and the 
associated country are named. According to the agreements co-operation takes 
place at all diplomatic levels but primarily in the UN General Assembly10 and
10 The like-minded character of the associated country and the member states can be easily 



























































































the CSCE/OSCE. It is another form of co-operation that regular information is 
provided to the associated country on CFSP activities.
The associated countries have access to four foreign policy instruments. 
They may align themselves with EU declarations, may adhere to EU political 
démarches and with separate declaration may join EU common positions" and 
joint actions.1 2 In each case the conditions of participation are decided strictly by 
the EU and the extremely cautiously worded provisions of the guidelines leave 
ample room to find reasons not to invite the East-Central European countries at 
the EU’s full discretion. Of course, this impact is ensured not by direct political 
statements, but by devising very flexible rules. According to the revised 
‘Guidelines for enhanced political dialogue’ accepted on 19 October 1995, “due 
to the time factor involved ... it may not always be possible to have the 
associates participate”. Moreover “the EU side reserves the right to derogate 
from the above guidelines when this is warranted by the urgency of the matter or 
any other overriding concern".13 *The guidelines contain a further built-in 
restriction as well, though this may have some justification. The last sentence of 
point 1 reads: “in particular, the above guidelines may be non-applicable when a 
declaration or a démarche is addressed to one of the associated countries.”
With regard to joint actions, the EU has invited the associated countries 
only a few times to participate since the beginning of the co-operation. 
Therefore the main devices of foreign policy co-operation between the 
associated countries and the EU are in fact instruments which were 
characteristic features of the European Political Co-operation, and which have 
continued to dominate after Maastricht, namely declarations and démarches. In 
the beginning the EU invited the associated countries to join those declarations 
that concerned mainly matters of a less direct importance to East-Central 
Europe, such as democracy and peace in various countries of the Third World. 
The logic of invitation has not always been clear: for example the associated 
countries were invited to two declarations concerning the trial of an opposition 
leader in Nigeria but were not subsequently invited to the declaration 
condemning his execution. It is difficult to draw general conclusions concerning
operation see Pal Dunay, Tamas Kende and Tamas Sziics, The Integration of Central and 
Eastern Europe Into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Fifteen, in 
Marc Maresceau (ed.), Enlarging the European Union: Relations Between tile EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe (London -  New York, Longman, 1998), p. 331.
11 For quite a while the EU did not let the associated countries join common positions. See 
Guidelines for enhanced political dialogue with associated countries adopted by the EU 
Political Committee at its 31 May 1996 meeting.
12 It is legally impossible that candidate countries join common positions and joint actions 
directly.
13 Point 1 of the Guidelines, while point 6 reads: The EU and the associates will instruct their




























































































the EU policy on these matters. One can state preliminarily the following: The 
attitude changed gradually and particularly in the early phase of such co­
operation was based on caution. Later, gradually the associated countries were 
invited more frequently. On the average the associated countries are invited to 
join approximately one-third to half of all declarations.14 Nevertheless it is 
founded to state that the opinion of the associated countries has been asked 
almost exclusively on issues non-essential for them.15 The experience may 
suggest that the EU invited the East-Central European countries when the 
presidency has been ‘enlargement minded’ or when -  on non-controversial 
issues16 -  it can be politically demonstrated that the presidency is conscious of 
the fact that it may draw on the support of the associated countries. It is obvious 
that such a limited contribution to EU declarations is not in the interest of the 
associated countries. It is one of the main efforts of the candidate countries that 
the closer they get to membership they would have more relevant and active 
contribution to CFSP. Particularly when the accession negotiations are finished 
it would make perfect sense to associate those states with CFSP in its entirety. If 
it does not take place the gradual lead in to pillar 2 will not succeed and the 
socialisation with this policy of the EU would be postponed until after 
membership. Bearing in mind that associated countries have experience and 
insights on matters where the general knowledge of the EU is weaker then this 
early association would be mutually advantageous.17
The first time when the foreign policy structure of the associated countries 
and their ability to implement the CFSP acquis was tested could be seen in the 
country reports published in the summer of 1997. As will be demonstrated later, 
no particular problems emerged concerning CFSP and the emergence of no 
major problems could be expected during the screening in this field.18 This was,
14 This is the situation recently. Earlier, in the first half of the 1990s it was approximately 15 
per cent. See Dunay, Kende and Szucs, Op. cit. pp. 333-334.
5 It is suffice to mention a few examples that followed each other: East Timor, Myanmar, 
Afghanistan, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the arms embargo for ex- 
Yugoslavia. The first three are definitely of no import for the associated countries.
16 Nearly 15 years ago in an analysis of Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Commission 
decisions I had to draw very similar conclusion. Namely that several elements of the 
declarations of the Warsaw Treaty (Cambodia, Horn of Africa, Angola, Mozambique, etc.) 
did not matter to any member state but the Soviet Union. The importance and world political 
outlook of the candidate countries, many of which were member states of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation, did not change since. Thus a very similar conclusion can be drawn for such 
associations as well. See Pal Dunay, Hungary’s Security Policy, Hamburger Beitriige, No. 17, 
April 1987.
17 It is suffice to mention Poland’s experience with Belarus and Ukraine as an example.
15 It is suffice to cite the position of Estonia on Common Foreign and Security Policy in its 
entirety to see how little problem the candidate countries anticipate in this policy area: “Based 
upon the conclusions of the screening of the above mentioned chapter Estonia is prepared to 




























































































however the first opportunity for the EU to make an overview of its CFSP 
acquis.19 No transitional period or derogation was requested and the negotiating 
positions of the candidates demonstrated problem-free harmonisation in this 
area. The only candidate country where problems have been visible is Cyprus 
due to the division of the island. It was much later, during the Portuguese 
presidency in spring 2000 when a compromise solution was achieved on the 
matter in co-operation with the French, Dutch, Greek and UK governments. This 
made possible to close the CFSP chapter of the negotiations with the candidates. 
It seems that the problems of the negotiations related to that chapter are confined 
to technicalities. Problems are mentioned related to “diplomatic and consular 
protection, co-operation with third countries and international institutions...”20 
Hungary reported the need to carry out “structural changes in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs enabling it to fully participate in the formulation and 
implementation of CFSP (the establishment of a Political Director’s post). The 
technical capacity for electronic communication of the Ministry will also be 
stepped up.”21 In some other cases the consular protection of citizens of EU 
countries may present a problem.
After having presented this idyllic picture about the prospects of co­
operation in the field of CFSP in preparation for membership of the East-Central 
European countries it is necessary to consider whether any problem can emerge 
after accession. CFSP relies primarily on declaratory measures and in its current 
form does not pose any problem for the candidate countries. Consequently, the 
fundamental question is whether there is any perceivable difference between the 
foreign policy orientation of the western European countries as a bloc and some 
of the candidate countries. It is necessary to emphasise here again that none of 
the candidate countries are great powers and none of them have major interests 
outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Consequently it is not expectable that any 
candidate would have any problem with the extra-European policy of the Union. 
Declarations on the cultural heritage in Afghanistan, the welcoming of the 
ratification of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court by Andorra or 
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa will go through the channels of the Union
to request any transitional period or derogation to the acquis in this chapter. Estonia is 
prepared to adopt the acquis in this chapter in full on accession to the European Union.” 
Estonian position on adoption of the relevant acquis on Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
http://www.vm.ee/euro/english/positions/chap27.html
19 During the accession talks with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden the acquis was 
strictly limited.
20 Negotiating Position of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on Chapter 27 -  
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 10 September 1998. The government of Slovenia had 
promised to adopt a new law on foreign affairs that was adopted actually in 1999.
1 Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Chapter 27 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 8 September 1998. The technical facilities have 




























































































just as smoothly as nowadays. There are three areas where problems might 
emerge in the future. They are the following: 1. Eventual ruptures between 
Europe and the United States. 2. Policy with respect of the Russian Federation 
and the CIS area more broadly. 3. Human rights, more specifically the minority 
policy of some countries.
As far as U.S.-European relations are concerned it is fairly difficult to 
predict their future evolution. It is obvious that there are important common 
interests and values shared by these two important players of international 
relations, the EU and the U.S. There are some divisions as well, however. If one 
tries to understand why the United States should find it advantageous to have a 
Europe with a more independent CFSP the following can be drawn. Bearing in 
mind that Western Europe is the partner of the U.S. that shares most of the 
fundamental values it has declared it may be to the benefit of the new “uni-pole” 
to have a critical partner that does not challenge it.22 One may call this “Europe 
as a reality check”. Europe may also be the partner that represents “a new 
concept of power” combining military and non-military factors of security. This 
is particularly to the advantage of the U.S. in those cases when the U.S. as 
“trigger happy sheriff’ may be tempted to rely on military force prematurely or 
unnecessarily.23 It may well be, however that reason will not dominate foreign 
policy thinking and actions in Washington. If there is rivalry between the two 
actors the U.S. may be tempted to have as many countries “on its side” as 
possible. This is the worst nightmare of decision-makers in East-Central Europe. 
It results in a situation that the two “mentors” of these countries are pulling them 
into different directions. The candidate countries are not only confined to the 
European theatre in their international relations but have been policy taker and 
not policy maker countries for several decades. Europe, or some Europeans at 
least, reacts vehemently when allegiance with the U.S. seems to contradict 
European commitments. France, for example blamed Poland as a “Troyan horse 
of America in Europe building its independent military capability”.24 It is fully 
unpredictable what will be the position of the candidate countries in case they 
face a “choice” between the U.S. and the EU. Most probably they would not be 
able to live up to a strategic choice and would rather pursue a “muddling 
through" policy.
22 An American scholar in an interview in Washington said to the author that it may be so on 
the scholarly, analytical level. The perception may be fundamentally different on the level of 
inter-state contacts where such a critical or maverick attitude may not be welcome by the U.S. 
government. Interview at the Brookings Institution on 7 September 2000.
These reasons (and a third one) are listed by Julian Lindley-French, Why America needs 
Europe, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union Newsletter no. 31, 
October 2000
24 Polska krytykuje plany obronne UE (Poland criticises the defence plans of the EU), 
Rzeczpospolita, 12 December 1999. Quoted by Ryszard Zieba. Development of European 




























































































It is the Russian Federation and the CIS area generally where some of the 
candidate countries have an understandably high political profile. The bitter 
experiences of decades and in some case centuries left their imprint. Some 
candidate countries regard the recent experience with Russia as a series of 
attempts by Moscow to play great power games and disregard the perceived 
national interests of some small countries of the region. This Russian attitude 
has generated sensitivity and may occasionally result in over-reaction. 
Geographic proximity fuels this further. The EU has developed a co-operative 
engagement policy with the Russian Federation and tries to induce, largely 
unsuccessfully, positive developments over there. For these reasons the Russia 
policy of Poland, Hungary or the Baltic states, particularly Estonia and Latvia 
which host sizeable Russian ethnic minority, differs from the course taken by 
some European great powers that intend to placate Russia.
It is suffice to cite two recent statements to illustrate the hard feelings in 
East-Central Europe. “We, in Poland, are willing to build good neighbourly 
relations with Russia. We are saying this in a new political situation, with 
Poland involved with Euro-Atlantic and European solidarity structures which, 
although not anti-Russian, do not include Russia as their participant. Poland’s 
membership of Western alliances and its endorsement of the independence and 
pro-Western orientation of states created on the rubble of the Soviet empire 
should not stand in the way of development of economic and cultural relations 
between Russia and Poland...”23 *5 The words of the Hungarian Prime Minister a 
year later are similarly illuminating: "... Hungary has occupied its place in the 
western world while its geographical position did not change. Hungary does not 
regard the countries further to the east as enemies, seeks to co-operate with 
them. ... I would like to make it clear that the two matters that Hungary is a 
committed supporter and part of the western security system and that we seek 
good economic relations with Russia do not contradict to each other. ... [W]e 
seek good relations, want to strengthen our economic relations, we are gladly 
taking part in co-operations of cultural character, but there is a clear dividing 
line between us in the sense of security and defence policy. I could say the more 
intensively we co-operate economically, the clearer and sharper dividing line 
has to be drawn between us, the eastern-most member-state of NATO and the 
territories further to the east, in the field of security and defence.”26 It is clear 
from Orban’s statement that his most important security-related preoccupation is 
the instability of the region further to the east of Hungary. To put it differently,
23 The Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland
Presented by His Excellency Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the
78lh Session of the Parliament on May 9th, 2000, p. 8.
26 A miniszterelnok a feladatszabo ertekezleten /The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning 





























































































Hungary is willing to co-operate with Russia in low politics, while it has severe 
reservations to do it in high politics. It was not the first time that the Hungarian 
Prime Minister shed light on his impressions about the Russian Federation. In 
1999 he said in an interview to the Canadian daily Globe and Mail that even 
though Hungarians would not receive it happily in the case of a crisis situation 
the Hungarian government would be ready to consider the deployment of NATO 
nuclear weapons.27 Hungarian opposition politicians and experts denied the need 
and the possibility of such deployment whereas Russian military circles 
interpreted it as “psychological preparation” for nuclear deployment on the 
territory of the three new NATO members.28 Even though the great majority of 
Hungarians do not react emotionally to Russian developments a decade after the 
last Soviet soldier left the country some parts of the establishment have apparent 
problems to pursue a non-adversary based security policy. Similar feelings are 
known to be present in Warsaw, Tallinn and Riga and they are not entirely 
unfounded. It stems from the fact that Russia has enormous difficulties to adapt 
to a situation where it is an important regional actor but nothing else. States 
transiting from one international status to another, either declining or rising, 
often have a difficult period of accommodation.
As far as national minorities are concerned it seems certain that some 
countries joining before others will import some minority related problems. 
Some have sizeable minority groups on their territories, like Estonia and Latvia 
others have ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries, like Hungary. Currently 
the fact that associated countries do not participate in démarches related to the 
treatment of minorities in other candidate countries or in countries not 
candidates for membership puts the problems that may stem from the situation 
on the backbumer. The moment some countries join the EU, like Hungary 
probably acceding before Romania and Slovakia, they will have formal 
influence on eventual future EU actions on this matter and a chance to influence 
the common position of the Union. In spite of some difficulty that may stem 
from this I see no reason to be concerned for a number of reasons. The 
“demander” state has always had a chance to express its opinion in case it found 
the treatment of its ethnic brethren’s inappropriate. Through integration in CFSP 
the statements of the member country, in case it opts for an EU channel, would 
go through a screening process. It would be confronted with the position of other 
members less directly involved in the matter. This may contribute to moderation 
and ease rather than burden the matter. It is highly unlikely that the one “directly 
affected” country would determine the opinion of others rather than the other
" Orban a sajat “atomfegyver-nyilatkozatarol” /Orban about his nuclear weapons statement/, 
Nepszabadsag, 1 November 1999.
28 Orosz fenyegetes az uj NATO-tagoknak atomfegyver-telepltes esetere /Russian threat to 
new NATO members in case of nuclear weapon deployment/, Magyar Tavirali Iroda 




























































































way round. This conclusion can be drawn easily if one starts out from the power 
relations more broadly, and does not focus exclusively on the concrete issue. 
Consequently, there is no reason to assume that this matter would cause a 
problem following eastern enlargement.
The rhetoric, if not the policy, of some candidate countries may cause 
some difficulties after EU accession and may require a certain adaptation period 
particularly in case some of them decide to keep a high profile in common 
foreign policy. There are three observations that may ease the concerns: 1. The 
first three East-Central European countries that have joined NATO kept a fairly 
low profile, co-operative attitude ever since, including the highly controversial 
Kosovo crisis. 2. The first decade of co-operation between the EU and the East- 
Central European candidate countries was a mutual learning process. The 
socialisation of national establishments has played an important role in it. The 
coming half a decade or so will further strengthen this process. Consequently 
there is reason to assume that by the time the first countries of the region will 
have full access to CFSP mutual understanding will prevail. The preparation for 
membership should help that membership would not come as a shock to the new 
members. 3. The professionals of the state administrations have already toned 
down occasional inflammatory political rhetoric and represented continuity. It is 
suffice to mention the course of EU enlargement talks in this context. 
Negotiators have carefully measured the long-term national interest of the 
countries and made sincere efforts to carry them into effect. They have made 
attempts to civilise their masters, the politicians in government who rotated 
more often than it would have been practicable. In sum, worries may remain but 
will have to remain limited.
4. Common European Security and Defence Policy and the Associate 
Countries: Has Everything Changed?
When the system change occurred western concerns were voiced about the 
prospects of the democratic control of armed forces in East-Central Europe. 
Pessimism extended both to the danger of military praetorianism and the 
prospects of modernisation of the armed forces. Since then, patterns of civil- 
military relations have become more complex and varied. The world has been 
facing a “parting of the ways”. It is a common characteristic feature that the 
military made no attempt to gain control of the state anywhere in the region. In 
some cases, however the militaries played some political role (as on 4 October 
1993 in Moscow) and there were cases where relations of the civilian and 





























































































In the more narrowly defined geographic area, those of the EU candidate 
countries, this paper aims to analyse the situation looks more reassuring. Due to 
the coexistence of a number of factors, both internal and external, the political 
control of the armed forces has been firmly established, the military has 
accepted the new political system and internal modernisation of the armed 
forces has started. Three countries have become members of NATO and other 
associates of the EU are waiting for their NATO membership invitation. In the 
invitation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland military considerations 
played marginal role. The whole process was politically driven. Some politico- 
military matters played a certain role in it, like the formal political control of the 
armed forces, etc. Late in preparation for the first invitations, military 
considerations started to appear on the margin. They were confined to a “fiscal 
approach” and addressed the costs of enlargement. The cost issue dominated the 
debate in three senses: a) How much will enlargement cost? b) Who (which 
country -  current or future members) will bear them? c) How can military 
modernisation be fostered in the candidate countries through the increase of 
military appropriations? The result of these considerations was the following: 
Enlargement was carried out “on the cheap”. The official study of the Alliance, 
contrary to two earlier studies, those of the Rand Corporation and the 
Congressional Budget Office, minimised the costs for the 16 members. The 
majority of the costs will have to be borne by the candidate countries. A formal 
commitment was taken by the candidates during the accession negotiations to 
increase their defence budgets compared to their GDP. The result of this narrow 
and somewhat arbitrary interpretation of military requirements before NATO 
membership resulted in a situation that the first three members from East- 
Central Europe have faced some difficulty to live up to requirements and an 
increasing dissatisfaction of some other members, primarily of the United States 
and the leaders of the political and military structures of the Alliance. The lesson 
was learned and the Atlantic Alliance stepped up requirements for future 
candidates. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) aims to prevent the recurrence 
of similar situation. The U.S. Senate did not only commit the executive branch 
to consult it before the next invitations are extended but required detailed 
information about the military capabilities of the candidates and their potential 
to contribute to collective defence. Bearing in mind the pivotal importance of 
the consent of the U.S. to further NATO enlargement(s) the adaptation of the 
defence sector of candidate countries will have to take place before gaining 
membership, at least partly. This could provide an easy escape route for the 19- 
members alliance. With reference to the insufficient level of military adaptation 
it is easy not to extend invitation to any country. The situation of course 
becomes delicate and complex if we conclude that the dominance of politics will 
continue to lead the process. I.e. the role of military considerations has been 




























































































There are different ways to assess the performance of the militaries in 
East-Central Europe. It can be measured against the complexity of the 
transformation of the societies and economies after several decades of 
“socialism”. If one starts out from that there is reason to show understanding to 
that the reform of the defence sector, particularly as far as its investment heavy 
phase, was not high on the priority list of the candidate countries. It can also be 
taken into consideration that the transformation of the military sector of those 
NATO countries, which gained membership during the Cold War, took many 
years, in cases decades, as well. Last but not least, it has to be taken into account 
that the candidate countries are all willing to the limits of their capacity, to 
participate in the conflict management and post-conflict settlement efforts of the 
international community.29 It is extremely important to emphasise it as there 
have been concerns that East-Central European countries want to join the “old” 
NATO focused on Article 5 commitments. Even though countries of the region 
perceive to have a security deficit where Art. 5 commitments come in handily as 
compensation it does not mean they neglect the conflict management task of the 
Alliance. This is important for the EU as well as the East-Central European 
countries. The candidate countries will be co-operative partners in implementing 
the Petersberg tasks as they are defined currently. There is another way to 
measure military performance, however. Namely, it can be compared to that 
whether the countries live up to the maximum they could have achieved in a 
decade since the system change. In that case the result is far more disappointing. 
In many cases there is insufficient determination to modernise the armed forces, 
zigzags, reform plans drafted hastily, but never carried into effect. In sum, the 
political and politico-military adaptation is underway whereas there are severe 
shortcomings in the military-technical field.
The Atlantic Alliance is regarded as the primary external security provider 
for the region and the most important security institution. That is why the advice 
of NATO, with the decisive involvement of the United States, is listened most 
attentively. No other international institution, except the WEU that has never 
been taken seriously in the region,30 is assumed to be able to contribute 
substantively to the security of the East-Central European countries. This is due, 
among others to the fact that many candidate countries have some residual 
concerns that may make (individual and) collective self-defence necessary. It
29 It is suffice to mention that each East-Central European candidate for EU membership 
participates in SFOR and eight countries are also participating in KFOR. It is only Latvia and 
Romania, which are not present in KFOR. See the “Nations Contributing to SFOR” 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/nations/sformations.htm and “The Nations of KFOR” 
http://www.kforinline.com/kfor/nations/default.htm
I recognise that it would be extremely difficult to provide evidence to this. Official politics 
will never declare that an institution is irrelevant when at the same time the respective country 




























































































does not mean that these countries are mavericks, which do not share the 
importance of power projection capabilities or pay lip service to conflict 
management exclusively. It does mean, however that the security perception of 
these countries induces a different mix of power projection and territorial self- 
defence than that of many EU member-countries. Consequently, only such an 
institution can claim credibility in the security of these countries that can 
address the full continuum of military capabilities ranging from low intensity 
peace-keeping to high intensity collective self-defence. In light of this the EU 
that has recently started to claim to have some security relevance also in the 
military sense faces a number of difficult challenges. It does not have to fight 
the disadvantage of a newcomer security institution, only. Furthermore, it has to 
counteract a temporary disadvantage. Namely, NATO has “completed” its first 
eastern enlargement earlier than the EU. Thus it has gained a “premium” 
credibility as an institution that has “meant” enlargement. The EU has to face a 
clear definition of its potential security role. Its current, Petersberg confined, 
definition does not cause problem to the candidate countries.
Whereas the EU has gained some vague security relevance in the 
Maastricht Treaty it took nearly a decade to move from verbal reassurance to the 
expression of the willingness to build some operational military capability in 
order to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks.31 Irrespective the objective of 
the EU confined to the Petersberg tasks the matter has become highly 
controversial. For some it is the first step in the direction of a collective defence 
capability of the EU, for others the Petersberg tasks represent the maximum 
acceptable. Certain co-operation mechanisms have been established in order to 
create an inclusive project. It gives preference to two groups of states: The 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance (the group of six composed of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) and the 
candidates for EU membership and the European NATO members (the group of 
15-13 candidates and two European NATO countries, Iceland and Norway).
The idea of the EU to gain some security relevance represents a major challenge 
for the countries, which would like to integrate both in NATO and the EU. The 
challenge is that none of them want to jeopardise its interests at either 
organisation. Furthermore they are strongly committed to the presence of the 
United States in Europe and would not subscribe to a project that threatens with 
disengagement of the U.S. from Europe. In this sense the view o f the candidate 
countries is a mirror image of the old Soviet -  and now to some extent Russian -  
view that Europe without U.S. presence gives more room for manoeuvring to the 
Soviet Union and thus a better place. The candidates are strongly of the view
It is impossible to address the basics of CESDP here. For my views on the topic in more 
details see "U.S.-EU Relations after the Introduction of the Euro and the Reinvention of 





























































































that Europe is safer with the presence of the U.S., among others as'it keeps ^ 
Russia under control. It is probable that this view is shared many 
member-states as well. '-7.
Already at an early stage of the EU plans to bring about CESDP the 
candidates expressed their view clearly. Poland, among the basic principles of 
the development of European security and defence policy mentioned that “such 
arrangements, aimed at developing a European crisis response capability, should 
reinforce the transatlantic link and the USA presence in Europe and thereby 
stability and security on the continent. That makes it essential to see that they 
reflect the role of the Atlantic Alliance in the security sphere and its pivotal 
significance for the defence of the whole North Atlantic area...”32 *Hungary 
expressed its view somewhat more enigmatically: “The continued commitment 
to a firm transatlantic relationship and the strategic co-operation between NATO 
and the European Union are the prerequisites of the effective European crisis 
prevention.”3j After the Helsinki EU summit and the publication of the headline 
goals the four Visegrad countries declared that they perceive the Petersberg 
operations “as enhancing the Euro-Atlantic security, of which the North Atlantic 
Alliance is the cornerstone”.34
The new members of NATO demonstrated the fundamental difference 
between a de facto non-aligned country and a member of the Atlantic Alliance: 
“Over a year after that memorable date of March 12, 1999, we can derive with 
satisfaction from the fact that we have managed to ensure for Poland the highest 
standard of security. Without it, all our other achievements and striving would 
have been burdened with the risk of impermanence...”’5 The Prime Minister of 
Hungary expressed it somewhat differently in relation to the Kosovo conflict: 
“Due to our fast NATO accession we have arrived at the outbreak of the warlike 
conflict not defenceless, lonely but as equal member of the strongest military 
alliance.”36 It is clear the new members of the Alliance regard their membership 
as symbolic arrival on their way to become a full-fledged member of the western 
security community.
2 Polish Position on the Development of European Security and Defence Policy, November 
1999, p. 1.
”  Hungary’s position on European security and defence, November 1999, p. 1.
’4 Joint Declaration of the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs, European Integration and Defence 
Committees of the Visegrad Four Countries adopted at their 5,h Meeting, Bratislava, 26,h to 
28lh of January 2000, p. 1. http://visegrad.org/events.php?kdy=2628april2000
35 Geremek, Op. Cit. p. 1.
’<l Parlamenti vitanap: a miniszterelnok expozéja (29 April 1999) /Day of Debate in the 





























































































Despite the strong NATO commitment of both the first three East Central 
European member states and the candidates for membership in the Atlantic 
Alliance these countries do not want to challenge CESDP openly for a number 
of reasons. One, maybe the most important of them is that it would be unwise 
not to demonstrate commitment toward an organisation to which the country 
hopes to join. Furthermore, nobody knows whether the CESDP will turn out to 
be a success or a failure. It is impossible to predict whether due to a declining 
U.S. commitment to Europe CESDP will gain weight or not. The mixed signals 
of Washington during the last two years have certainly prevented the candidate 
countries to increase their effort in the CESDP. The candidates were giving in to 
expectations and offered their contributions to the EU Capabilities Commitment 
Conference held in November 2000. Eight of the ten candidates37 offered 
smaller or larger contingents ranging from one thousand soldiers (Poland) down 
to a couple of dozens. Beyond the symbolic contribution eight East- Central 
European candidate countries have made, they all feel strongly about the right to 
participate in shaping those decisions that lead to putting an operation into 
practice. Some aims to achieve this co-operatively, others, notably Turkey, are 
determined to block the decision-making process if necessary. With reference to 
danger of mission creep and the rights Turkey enjoyed as associate member in 
the WEU it does not want to give its consent to the autonomous use of NATO 
assets and capabilities for EU military operations. This is certainly an important 
part of Turkish thinking on CESDP, a country in close vicinity of most conflict 
zones where CESDP could be invoked. There is another factor as well. It is 
understandable that Turkey, a country with no chance for EU membership in the 
coming decade, wants to get closer to the EU in areas where it has leverage. 
According to a Turkish foreign ministry official: "... we should establish a 
mechanism where all NATO and EU governments concerned could be 
represented throughout the critical stages of defence planning. ... non-EU 
European Allies should be able to discuss their contributions to the Headline 
Goal in the presence of all the countries concerned ... the ongoing process in the 
EU as regards the Headline Goal should be open to all non-EU Allies. This 
means participation in the planning, preparation, implementation and review 
processes of Headline Goal itself.”38 It is not surprising that other candidate 
countries do not support the position of Turkey. They are afraid in case NATO 
assets and capabilities are not offered to the EU for CESDP missions
37 The two countries that refrained from taking a commitment were Bulgaria and Romania. In 
case of the latter it is clear the timing of the capabilities commitment conference was 
unfortunate as it
coincided with parliamentary and presidential elections. In case of the former the invitation 
to contribute arrived late it did not leave time for serious professional consideration and was 
thus not regarded a serious offer by Minister of Defence Noev, former NATO ambassador of 
his country.
jS Amb. Sadi Calislar, Director General for International Security Affairs of the Ministry for 




























































































automatically there will be more temptation to develop autonomous planning 
capabilities in the EU. This may bring EU -  NATO/U.S. de-coupling closer -  an 
idea none of them favour.
It is premature to tell what direction the evolution of the CESDP will take 
in the years to come. The current heavy emphasis on the military side of conflict 
prevention and management is not necessarily the one that fills in a niche. The 
shortage of competence and resources is far more eloquent in the areas of 
international policing as well as other non-military forms of conflict 
management. Thus a reorientation of the project in that direction would certainly 
be welcome by the East-Central European countries among others in order to 
better contribute to European security and avoid unnecessary duplication with 
NATO. This would make it possible for them not to face a painful choice 
between their Trans-Atlantic and European allegiances. It is clear that in this 
early stage of the project it would be fairly difficult to adapt to it anyway. When 
it is further exacerbated by the project’s elusive character and the situation is 
aggravated by that one presidency country puts a clearly different emphasis than 
the other this is nearly impossible. It is suffice to quote a French official: “The 
real problem is the Swedish presidency... Sweden is changing the terms of 
reference agreed at the Nice summit last year by dealing much more with 
NATO”39 Most probably similar statements will be aired later about the 
selection of priority by one presidency country or the other. The insufficiently 
clear orientation of CESDP makes adaptation difficult even for the “best pupils” 
among the candidate countries.
5. Conclusions
The countries of East-Central Europe consider their integration in conservative 
categories based on boxes. In this system the Atlantic Alliance is the security 
provider. The European Union is not regarded as a security institution and 
beyond the weight of its components it is not supposed to be a security giant. 
The countries of the region do not have any problem with the declaratory part of 
common foreign and security policy. They are at ease to be associated with it. 
They are somewhat dissatisfied with their current level of integration in CFSP 
just a few years away from membership.
The security concept of the East-Central European countries is based on 
the need to combine conflict management and collective defence capabilities. 
Consequently, only those security institutions can count with the support of the 
EU candidates that can provide for all parts of the spectrum. The Petersberg 
tasks as declared by the Amsterdam Treaty stop short of this. In case the EU




























































































goes beyond its current confines transatlantic solidarity is endangered if not the 
EU will be in the position of being unable to satisfy the security needs of the 
region. It is for this reason that the support of the candidate countries will 
remain lukewarm for the CESDP. A more clear orientation of the project and the 
promise that it would be put into practice could certainly contribute to a bit more 
support for CESDP in East-Central Europe. Moving from declaratory policy to 
operational activity represents a quantum leap for the EU and it is no less 
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